Phenomenology of the Extreme Religious Experience

Personalization and the Limits of Agency in Islam

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Abstract: Methodologies of social sciences have long rejected the subjectivist orientations recommended by the German way of both Phenomenology and Hermeneutics; thus, the positivist spirited methods of data collection and analysis used in the social inquiry have never eclipsed the value of subjective significant drivers behind the individual and collective agency. In regards to the extremist religious behaviour; an urgent need is felt among social science practitioners to comprehend how persons, groups, and communities ascribe meaning and values to their actions. The whole activist program of Jihad depends on the signifying phenomenological genesis which structures the moral ontology within the Muslim's spiritual lived experience. Given that the approach focuses on the individual amount of experience, a psycho-phenomenological apparatus is used to describe the constitution of meaning. Whereas Hermeneutics covers both categories of shared Morals and the sacred text horizon of significance, this study aims to invest the elaborated path of Religious Hermeneutics along with the personalist assessment of the Muslim value guided process of self-identification. The main hypothesis attempts to argue how an absolutist way of valuation is based on the nominal morality in Islam. It might be useful to measure this causation when it leads to the spectacular depersonalized extreme act of self-negation. The exposure of an ontological agency should be the subsequent phase of the above-mentioned voice of description.

Keywords— Personalism, Death, Value, Believers, Extremism

I. INTRODUCTION

While reviewing retrospectively the contribution of social sciences scope to the specific problems of extremism in the Muslim societies and abroad, one can be led by the non-deliberated assumption that the scientific scope can provide a thorough explanation of the phenomenon. Whereas the category to investigate is much more challenging for the investigators, a critique is needed as to re-introduce the collective subjectivity into the field of study. A preliminary reflection ought to be provided to argue how in most Muslim societies the explanatory schemes of economic and social conditions behind observed phenomena need to be supplemented by a phenomenology of collective self-valuation. This study starts from the phenomenological equivalence between extremism and a culturally spirited collective self-valuation. If this starting ground of description is accepted, the research will no longer limit its explanatory scheme of extremism to the economic-social observable factors; much attention ought to be paid to the way a sacred Textualism redefines the collective consciousness, and the agency postulated behind acts of extremism will be described rather in terms of a hermeneutic process put under the influence of the absolutist sign of God.

There are two phases that are methodologically articulated in this study: the first one exposes the notional lacunas of informed social sciences' scope currently practiced on the issue; the second attempts to provide a hybrid outlook which takes into account the fact that both community and collective life are still socially structured by means of a textual absolute justification of agency.

II. A WAY TO STUDY THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS

Ever since the eighteenth century, studying religious consciousness has posed ethical and methodological challenges to both morals and natural sciences; neither objective data description nor rationalistic explanations have been able to evade the variety of theological and anthropological underpinnings at stake. Nevertheless, there was a need to reframe the humanistic landscape of religious consciousness, and the only method available was Phenomenology, with its descriptive inquiry into subjective categories of significance proposed since the nineteenth century. The moral behind such a method was to prioritize modalities of inner sources of Faith and its significance over a would-be "objective" meaning in God's message. (Schleiermacher, 1893: 7) Meanwhile, emphasizing on the message's meaning risks being questioned by proponents of the scientific method, who prefer to examine religion as a social organizational behaviour; in other words, they claiming that there is no more subjective field to be reached behind the realistic structural organization

formed by people under the divine sign, whether it theism or polytheism, and that the recurring behaviour of agents is regularized under phenomenal laws.

The former feud is part of a larger debate that began with the clash between positivistic methodologies and the emerging Humanities´ fields (Dilthey, 1992: 89). As a result, the concept of subject-based investigation is to be contributed to the collective level of experience. The religious faith is therefore gradually realized if only the universal assumptions underlying people' sentiments are somehow priory and virtually assigned to every person of the same group (James, 1997: 50). The latter aspect of religion has been kept out of the scope of the phenomenological approach; the fact that every believer is consciously linked to others is less an issue of empirical social collectiveness. Hence, it is best dealt with as the first phenomenological genesis of meaning, and it mobilizes both ethics and inquiries into the spiritual agency.

The rise of phenomenological religious studies was due to the preparation made by the religious reformers; a constant reference made to the individual's faith suggested a reversed dealing focusing rather on the unveiled contents of the believer's interior (Fruchon, 1994: 76). The appearance has been taken only to indicate the realm of another life experienced within the consciousness sphere (Hegel, 1993: 929). Due to the modern theological parameters of *immanency,* Spirit ought to be inherent to individuals' lives; this renders the ethical and religious expressiveness thinkable. Hence, Kant, Hegel, and Lambert have each invested the new scheme opened by reading the within from *with-out*, and the term *Phenomenology* has since entitled the new program suggested for challenging the perennial dogmatic theology using new descriptive lines offered by a nascent *Religionswissenschaft* (Knoblauch, 2001).

The old canonical dealings with religious matters during the post-reform era opened the doors wide to a variety of patterns-based descriptions of religious subjectivities. The nineteenth century has provided the studies of religious anthropology with a spectrum of a phenomenon to the extent that the idea of a universal nexus of religious faith becomes questionable. Nevertheless, the methodological progress made in Social sciences and Humanities fed the willingness to sharpen further the phenomenal status of religious faith (James, 1997: 92). The large array of diversity opposed the hard task to pursue a close description of the subjective within the sphere of individual's meaning set behind the scene; a newly born psychology has been recommended to construct hybrid categories, relying on both religious emotions and phenomenal spiritual meanings (Mullen, 1981: 47). The two pioneer attempts which engaged phenomenology quite differently on the issue were provided by W. James and M. Weber; the former pushed psychology into the path of descriptive phenomenology while still relying on the empirical environment within which the religious emotional life arises (James, 1956: 232). While the second enlarged the scope of meaning categories to encompass the way societies and communities project their faith to constitute an ideal type of religious creeds, and thus recursively shaping their practical ways of living (Weber, 2002:156); for both theoretical attempts a major epistemic and methodological challenge has been raised. In other words, there is a dire need to rehabilitate the subjective typologies of religiousness and their modifying effects on behalf of context-based communities and societies.

For the qualitative assessment of the subject matter, the question about religious agency has been taken into account in Weber's contribution to Protestant ethics. The notion that no aspect of global understanding goes without a practical counterpart is a key idea. Weber's sociology of religion is openly based on the analytic outcome behind establishing a hermeneutical connection between *die Weltanschauung* (worldview) and the practical issues of daily and sectorial activities. The sociologist is unquestionably committed to inquire about the actor's self-ascription of meaning all the while; to do so, one has to experience it oneself at a psychological level. The ideal type of meaning and valuation is somehow a participative adventure to adjudicate the meaning value as needed in context. The same belonging structures both the actor's subjective stance and the investigator's as well; if this heuristic fact is admitted, then no methodological generalization is likely to be made.

III. ISLAM'S FORMAL *SHAHADA* AND THE GENESIS OF PERSONIFICATION

If one conceptually acknowledges what both James and Weber indicate, it is still needed to sharpen the drivers of Islam personalizing that lead to the extreme judgment on value as self-sacrifice. To borrow Weber´s conceptual scheme, actions are linked with values; and borrowing James´s notion that self-worth is but the outcome rendered real by the eternal process of altering one's area of experience. As a result, a distinguishing trait within the Islamic setting is that the pattern of personalizing is ethically driven under both the communal ideal and the *Qur'an's* sign of Allah's absolute significance (Lahbabi, 1967: 71).

In Islam, the phenomenon of the extreme moral agency has met a spectacular zealous curiosity and interest; the reference suggested by the term morality is meant to underline how the value ascribed to our deeds stems rather from the way the Muslim integrates the value attributed by God to his mundane existence. Thus, many *ayat*, (verses), from *Qur´an* give definitions as to how the believer ought to manage his/her relationship with peers, members of community, strangers, and the natural chain of beings around them. To a certain extent, the phenomenologist is called to portray explicitly how the

believer is led from a definite religious creed to the paramount agency towards his peers and the surrounding world. This phenomenological data ought to be taken at face value not only to investigate the outward effect of externalizing beliefs in terms of praxis but also the inward edification made to the person "I" and its proper self-value. Lahbabi's attempt to provide guidelines for the Islam scheme of personalization has invested the phenomenological consciousness of the Muslim's life valuation together with the religious personal identity-making (Lahbabi, 1967: 21).

If it is admitted that the para-phenomenology of life is tied to every Muslim consciousness, we will be justified to grasp the modalities of valuation applied to the mundane stage of hereby living. Therefore, the moral ascriptions of honor to deeds together with the spiritual catharsis reflect the uninterrupted process leading to God and Prophets' neighboring. The spectacular and politicized version *of Jihad* is but an external and communal aspect of a process that starts with interior fighting within the spiritual sentimentality to get to the stage of supreme purification. At its rudimentary and individual level, it dislocates the double determination of the soul by the body sins and the weakness of its spirituality due to the profane hegemony of desire and the hereby affairs. There is a non-sense to assume that there must be a specific difference between the communal appeal to better one's religious community for the sake of God's honour and the individual moralistic creed to perfect one's soul. The vector of private moral betterment is in tandem with the widening of the world's morality (Lahbabi, 1967: 52).

It is quite erroneous, for the same former reason, to establish an epistemic hiatus between mobiles of collective agency in Islam and the phenomenological scheme at work wherever psychology of belief is put under investigation (James, 1988:634). The pattern of Islamic personalization leads to compromise the sharp disciplinary binary made of individual and society. The Nation, found in *Kitab (holy book),* provides a prior principle of belonging to every individual who has deliberately performed the minimalist formal, ritual and verbal performance, which is the acknowledgment of *Allah's* absolute unity. To be *Kitabi (* literally belonging the religion based on the Islam's holy book*)*as a believer is to edify one's life and deeds in a way to be devoted to God's commandments, the prophet, and his companions; this voice is nonetheless traced by holy books and the moral biography of religious ancestors. However, an individualistic margin of free will is left for the believers; they are permanently set under the call to join the realm of the faithful and martyrs since personalization is taken to be the permanent living dialectics of self-identification. Thus, the former call never leaves the horizon of the persons; it is set in terms of an integrated personal ideal that never loses attraction upon them regardless of the variety of

sufferings and hardships experienced lifelong (Lahbabi, 1967: 59).

The nexus of Islamic *Ummah* (Religious Community/Nation) never takes the shape of a due institutionalized or politicized stance; it is, rather, the permanent possibility at hands for every faithful believer to re-establish the order of Allah. Besides, the so-called order is not limited to the macro-level of affairs in Islam; it is recommended right into every affair that engages action and behaviour are to stem from the recommended individual creed of every Muslim. Hence, valuation of actions is recursively referential to the potential of self-value (Mounier, 1935: 123). However, the latter is circularly made possible by the community of believers founded in turns on the pretended pietism of its individuals. The measure of valuated actions is nonetheless a part of the life personalization process that is open wide in front of the Muslim permanent self–identification.

The process through which *Qur'an's* precepts are integrated during life circumstances to the personal nexus is called Islamic personalization (Lahbabi, 1967: 55); from the outset, an exceptional driver must be taken into account; this is what E. Mounier has classically called a dialectics of the "I" and social reality; it's process ought to be mediated by the holy-text-based religious value of Quran. The abyss of the phenomenal social determination of agency is put under the critical and methodological driver of efficiency by social identification of community in Islam that is shaped under the holy sign of God's message. For a believer to be described as a *kitaabi* (a holy book based on religiousness) refers less to his religious sect than to the deliberatively chosen creed of putting the fate of one's existence and that of his community under God's commandment. A category of *existence* is then interpreted and projected into the path of an onto-theology (Heidegger, 1953: 338). The debatable feud about free will and determination could only be grasped if one admits that to be Muslim is to accept under no cohesive power to believe in Allah, and thus admitting that only God has the upper hand and last word on the fatality of the universe.

Every phenomenological description of personhood and the pietistic path of the believer should take into account the ontological meaning of *Shahada* or *Tashahood (* the act of it), literally witnessing the unity of Allah by saying that "*Allah is the only God*, *that theism is reserved to him at the detriment of any other being"* (Taha, 2000: 53). There is a spiritual axiology behind the verbal act of *Shahada* and the personal identity which fellows from its formal performance; the soul is supposed to enter Islam through such enunciation. It is thereby formally recognized to be put back to its source whenever it vows verbally to be part of God from whom it has received both its *Genesis* and existence. There is a fundamental interference between the living soul and its verbalism in Islam. The claiming of *Shahada* functions ontologically as an ascending

gesture by which the soul is elevated to its creator; this feature is both comprehended and fully performed in Islam when the person is about to die. He is morally asked to reiterate *Shahada* between the hands of God; the act is religiously venerated and well-considered by social morality to the extent that Islamic law calls any member of the community to pronounce *Shahada* for any other member who is about to die and unable to pronounce it (Lahbabi, 1967: 41). The ascendant path of an individual's soul is a voluntary nominal act that transcends life from the bodily condition to the purified self when the latter is rendered back to its creator.

As far as this phenomenological standpoint is concerned, death is given a moralistic function under the Islamic semantics of the voluntary ascendant act that renders the soul to its Senior-creator. The dead is not an individual who takes the path towards nothingness; whoever performs the act of *Shahada* while taking Allah as both the origin of his soul and the end of its fate is never dealt with as a dead; his soul remains living forever within the spiritual realm of Allah. Hence, besides the moral belief that the soul within humans is ontologically tied to its divine genesis, the Muslim transcends life right into every act to be conducted hereby. The category of life is rather attributed to the soul; the hybrid belonging of life to both the hereby and to the divine genesis of the soul is by itself the scheme upon which the conscious morality must be founded. (Schleiermacher, 1898: 36). If the Islamic law focuses much on the process of moralization along the lifetime of individuals, it could only justify this appeal through the recursive metaphysical path that leads souls from human affairs to their divine birthplace besides God and his neighbouring angels, prophets, and their followers. The phenomenology of moralization is revealing when it comes to investigate the practical side of ethics as a deliberative attitude led under the soul purification ideal. The moralistic betterment, *Tazkiat annafss,* contributes to underline the fact that *Jihad* is but an interior process conceived in such a way to ascribe the best shape to one's soul. Since life is an extendable category it covers both the practical affairs in actual experiences and the fate of our soul hereafter, the believer's consciousness is reshaped under the metaphysical finalism of the purified fate of the soul.

The former elucidation of the dogma based on *Shahada* is taken to enlighten the embrocated order of ontology and fundamental moral performance; the coming analysis is meant to clarify to what extent the fundamental nominal act of *Shahada* contains, in terms of axioms, the honorific and highly valuated morals of *Istichhad* (self-sacrifice) for the sake of God (Lahbabi, 1967: 43). Such a descriptive attempt will be incomplete if it provides no justificatory action commitment. The key point to focus on is the pattern of spiritual consciousness which starts with the nominal act and ends with the self-

negation as both the end –in-view and the limit of agency.

In Islamic literature, the jargon of action and the ethos of death are intertwined to the extent of leaving us perplexed as to when and how we are justified to say that someone has given his/her soul back to its creator and when he/she is simply dead. Therefore, a criterion ought to be introduced between moral conviction and spiritual agency. If the above-mentioned hypothesis about the metaphysics of spiritual life is true, then, Islamic moral consciousness follows the fate of the purified soul; it is permanently at work as a regularizing ideal of valuation concerning every practical issue of hereby life. The lifelong appeals of moral agency are spectacularly pushed into the ideal limits of purification; thereby, death is likely to be re-signified as an act that leads the spiritual morality towards the mundane limits of life. However, this could never happen without a community-based framework of valuation. As soon as the nominal performance of *Shahada* is done, an unseen hybrid ontological and moral framework starts its structuring effect within the consciousness of the believer (James, 1997: 81). The *Ummah* integrates its moral horizon of recommended acts and beliefs. Before the economy of social inter-determination which conditions human affairs, the precedence of EL *Kitab* to morals draws the universe of Islam's moral ideals. The believer's creed logged the ontological morality made by *Ummah* as the only structured field of ethics and the spiritual community; it is up to his pietism to make the order of *Kitab* identical with the order of his personhood as a member of a definite spiritual community in the real world (Lahbabi, 1967, 89).

The commonly named appeal of al *Usoliya (the* coming back to the sources of Islam: holy book and prophet lifetime*)* is but the incitement to master the actionable task ascribed to every Muslim; it is the claim to make society equivalent to the order of *Kitab.* The process of *Textualizing* society through the return to referential religious texts reflects the revival of the same belonging to the *Kitab.* It is worth mentioning at the outset that the formerly described appeal aims to conjugate textual identity with social interaction; these interfered orders invite scholars to investigate rather the twofold aspects of a phenomenological gesture: *Textualzing society and Socializing the holy text.*

As an aspect of personalization within a social medium, the process is led under the literal hermeneutic effect of the holy text, supreme sign, and value. The making of Islamic identity at the personal level is but the timely current identification of individuals within the historically prepared community of believers; it engages both the mundane situation of the Global *Ummah* and the actionable possibilities opened to its members and oriented towards their common horizon as it is ascribed by the *Kitab.* Since the speech of God that reflects the supreme source of law pronounced by God is in itself the fate made for

creatures, be they animals humans or cosmic components of the universe, but its emphasis ought to be made on the status of value ascribed to God's speech. It menstruates the ontological effect of the call of Allah *(Nidae)* addressed to his faithful believers. The message of the sacred address (Schleiermacher, 1893:106) contains the same commandment of *Shahada*; the one which qualifies the individual as a true Muslim. The witnessing of Allah's unity is the nominal performance of both Islam's belonging and the formal declaration of a new membership amidst its widest community *Ummah*. Once the formal and the spiritual qualification for the call are achieved, the only side of responsibility left behind to individuals is a practical program of moral purification in real acts (Lahbabi, 1967: 108).

IV. BELIEF, AGENCY AND THE LIMITS OF MORALITY

The nominalism of *Shahada* is incomplete from the phenomenological standpoint because witnessing takes the 'Act' of the unique creation by God as the fundamental nexus of ontology in Islam. The believer could not fulfill his/her spiritual fate without an equivalent rendering of his/her living soul to its creator in tandem with God's amendment. Hence, the nominalist stance of *Shahada* is but fully achieved when the act of God's creation is both spiritually and ontologically made meaningful through the ultimate rendering of the individual's soul to Allah. In popular Islamic parlance, a person does not perform the act of dying in any sense; she/he rather renders his/her soul to Allah. From beginning to end the personalization of believers' identity is placed under the call of *Shahada*; as far as Islamic life is concerned, there is no dividing line between ontology and spiritual morality (Taha, 200: 52). If such scheme is correct, then personalization within Islamic environment ought to be assessed relying on the valuated acts made by every individual while identifying him/herself according to the value of *Shahada.* However, the ontology of agency must be levelled; on one hand, there is a nominal function of *Shahada* as the first pillar of Islam because it generates the social and ethical bearings of religious conduct. On the other hand, a metaphysical vector of agency justifies the limits of morality pushed to the extreme ontology of spiritualism in Islam. The key question here is under which pretexts such metaphysics is rendered actionable as being the limit of both life and morality.

Moving to the nature of morality in Islam, an epistemic account ought to be taken into consideration. Morals are not structured according to a norm; it is spiritually embedded in such a way to consider God himself to be its highest point of valuation; this fact leads to the interfering significance of normativity and absolutism. The variety of attempts to check the logical and normative background of morality in Islam has trespassed the inherent ontological backings of the spiritual valuation in Muslim life. However, Weber's attempt to provide a social and religious scheme for ethical valuation reminds us of the role played by religious valuation

when it comes to study self-esteem and value at the personal level. The hermeneutics of the self is never put aside during the process of personalization; the aforementioned sense of morality is keen to the personal and intimate self-esteem and valuation (Weber, 2002: 156). In Islamic ethical life, the fundamental witnessing that God is our unique creator has its proper hermeneutic working amidst the lifelong process of identification; hence, the end of life is well integrated in the lifelong process of moralization. The purification of soul -*Tazkiat anafss*- is accomplished if only the latter is duly ascended to God; likewise, death is spiritually transcended under the effect of the Islamic moral ontology of *Shahada.* Nevertheless, a shift is made from the current understanding of death as a cosmic event among others to its religious interpretation as the believer's deliberated act, which actualizes the noun of *Shahada;* when the act instantiates the verb of *Shahada,* it becomes a spiritually deliberated death; it is literally an act of *Istishad,(*a subjective devotion to death through the honour of joining the spiritual realm of God*)* instead.

Under the sign of the supreme value and amidst the process of personal identification with the value, death is moved from the scope of events to the realm of actionable morality; the martyred is pronounced *Shahid* as she/he achieved in terms of the supreme act a kind of commitment already contained into the verbal formality of *Shahada*. Thus, not only does the complementary interplay between the *Noun* and the *Act* contribute to the Hermeneutics of the self in Islam, but also the functions tied to both levels are put into their widest scene of the whole ethical community (McLead, 2003: 39). Since birth, the individual needs to be initiated to Islam; the community guarantees her/his belonging through the pronunciation of the formal witnessing close to her/his ears. The nominal side of the formal witnessing plays the role of an ethical cohesion amidst believers of the same *Ummah,* such as the scene of birth, the daily praying, and the pilgrimage; the nominal *Shahada* is repeatedly performed to ritually remind the believers that their personal lives are projected into the virtually transcended act of global depersonalization within Allah and the *Ummah's* entity (Gilsnen, 1982: 202). If the formal witnessing functions socially for the sake of the communal cohesion, then the extreme actionable act of self-sacrifice is permanently possible. The bridging of the ontological gap between individual existence and the transcended individuality within the spirit of *Ummah* is the farthest limit of Islamic finalized personalization (Ibn Khaldoun, 2008: 445). Hence, the believer's self-sacrifice is a stage where personalization is conducted right into the latest destiny under the absolute value of Allah. All the senses attributed respectively to the *Fidai*, *Shahid*, and the *Mojahid* are evaluated under the sign of the honoured Spirit of *Ummah*.

This section is meant to establish the hermeneutic transition from the metaphysics of *Shahada* in Islam to the violent mundane aspect of the agency. The first

methodical remark to start with is to set the suggested dealing with the issue far from the explanatory dilemmas of linking violent extremism to causes and concrete socio-economic data; the claim is that religious agency is rather more comprehended by sensed *reasons* instead of direct real *causation*.

The previous descriptive scope of personalization has taken the lived world of believers to be a mundane deliberated orientation towards the absolute value of *Allah*, but practical issues are still in need of clarification (McLead, 2003: 51) as to how a Muslim is hermeneutically converted to an actionable self-destroy. There is a point in the limits of personalization where the willingness of free self-identification as a believer rejects away the personal autonomy for the sake of a joinable absolute value; it is worth mentioning that the ontological religious condition of such access is rather the contradictory performance of both a non-personalized and an idealized status, it ends with confining oneself to absolute God's mercy.

Death is only morally assessed if the dead achieved the spiritually performed act of rendering her/his soul to its unique creator. From a phenomenological point of view, there is an exchange between the believer's person and God which engages the ability by the first to transcend his spiritual existence. His/her own life's end is significantly performed conformably with the spirit of Islam as a recognized last mundane act after which the soul is put between the hands of Allah. Therefore, the scene of death gains the significance of an act; it becomes a volitional moral performance. However, the connecting stance between death and religious agency is inscribed within a hermeneutic value-based collectiveness; acts are signified within the believer´s economy of spiritual value. There must be a prior communal backing of valuation; an anthropological framing of the limits accedes to the sphere of morality when the notion of *Hodoud Allah,* literally translated as the borders of God, becomes actionable through the sacrifice performed by an individual when her/his honour, blood, and propriety are put into risk (Lahbabi, 1964: 56). Hence, the extreme religious agency only legitimates a bloody sacrifice when *Hodoud Allah* corresponds to the community moral interests. The identification between the limits of *Allah* and the moral honor of *Ummuh* or religious community is made to draw the sacred space amidst the profane anthropological affairs; thereby the Muslim's soul gets its moral and sacred qualification. The spiritual "I" comes to be moralized to the extreme through the act of self-destroy; a bloody scene of sacrifice is put into the register of morality only to socialize the ethical appeal for believers to be the faithful guards of the limits ascribed by *Allah* to draw the permanent honor of *Ummah*. Its cohesion and solidarity are divinely solicited (McLean, 2003: 60) to the extent that every believer invests the fate and value of her/his soul in.

The moral paradigm depicted formerly is common to many spiritual orientations; phenomenologists are legitimated to sketch out its general features through the exposure of significant meaning acts. They agree at the outset that spiritual morality is founded on the significant gestures of exteriorizing the interior form of spirit to make it a real-world life of communities and individuals. The key point is to take morality to be the sphere where the form of the interior spirit becomes by itself the form of the external moral life of the community since in Islam the borders of God are significantly ascribed to the identification of the spiritual community of believers. Personification could hardly be dissociated from the process of self-moralization within the absolute spirit of *Allah* and its manifestation through the religious community edification (Ibn Khaldoun, 2008: 200).

The nexus of morality is moved to the sphere of spiritualism; in other words, the fundamental belonging of the soul to the Islamic moralistic ontology and the acknowledgment that only God is the source of one's soul meets its full achievement. Whenever morals are performed under the origin of one's soul, they actualize in terms of the spiritual limits of life the true meaning of *Shahada*. Hence, *Jihad* is deliberately situated within the orbit of pure morality; the appeal for *Jihad* inscribed Islamic Morality far from the commonly admitted personal moral consciousness since responsibility ties actions to their measures within the moral workings of personal consciousness. The same appeal merges the horizons of personal selves with the spiritual non-personal boundaries of the soul made of *Ummah*, the individualist orientation towards self–destroy is the sign that depersonalization by death comprises in practice the stage of morality pushed to the extreme identification of the self and the absolute value (Hegel,1993:181).

An edification of moral responsibility is somehow removed in Islam from the topology of the personal 'I' to the witness of prophet, companions, and the community of believers. There is no straightforward autonomous "I" amidst the community of believers; the notion of responsibility is significantly projected rather upon the scene of communal believers. *Allah* has prescribed to the *Ummah* the status of witnessing hereafter the moral deeds of both the prophet and the community of Muslims. The top stage of expressing one's soul belonging to God is by itself the same acknowledgment of the whole spirit made of the *Ummah.* The scene of *Jihad* is no longer seen as the place of death; wherever the convicted Muslim bleeds, he contributes morally to the realization in real-world of the divine boundaries prescribed by *Allah*. It is hardly noticed along with the literature of Islamic morality how the three circumferences of Islamic spiritualism, the bloody valuated sacrifice, and the honor of *Ummah*'s territory are hermeneutically corresponding.

V. Death, Value and the "Horizon" of radical agency in Islam

Concerning the profane judgment on self-destroy, it remains external to the Muslim's fundamental

moralistic ontology. Islam's spiritual world is not discontinued or incommensurable with the mundane absolute valuation of both life and the self. The Hermeneutics of value does not deal with death as a horizon of self-finiteness (Heidegger, 1953: 315) because the self in Islam is not founded on the pure autonomous subjectivity; it rather puts its psychological feeling of liberty under the ultimate sign of God as the only destiny for the created soul. If what is formerly said about the moralistic ontology of *Shahada* is legitimate, then the moral world for a Muslim is not ontologically limited by the mundane facticity of death. The hereafter qualifiers of value work right into the ultimate stage of *Jihad*; morals do not stem from the finite boundaries of personal consciousness, but they are rather inscribed within the nature of the created soul, and thereby the morals of *Jihad* are only grasped in terms of a valuated notion of "*Life in God*". At this level of analysis, the shift from Personalism to the Hermeneutics of value is legitimated through the following question: How do individuals in Islam come to ascribe both a social and holy sense to their self–negation act as the most valuated stage of spiritual morality (Heidegger, 1953: 326)?

It is worth mentioning that the limits of moral agency in Islam are dogmatically situated between the existential religious life and the hereafter divine valuation of the faithful soul. If it is right to describe this situation as Heidegger recommended through his phenomenological ontology, then the self emerges as a person within the sphere of moral actions. It consists in transcending oneself or breaking beyond mere self-concern and projecting outward as a being whose very nature is to share with others for whom one cares and about whose welfare one is concerned. In this process, one identifies new purposes or goals for the sake of which the action is to be undertaken (McLean, 2003: 53). Furthermore, Heidegger's analysis is only completed if the undertaken action is deliberately sited within a *Horizon*; the key notion behind the hermeneutical use of the term is that the very moralistic semantics of our human actions are based rather on the spiritual efficiency of Horizons. The case of *Shahada* as the first pillar of Islam is founded mainly on the ontological interplay between mundane agency and the ultimate appeal made by the religious horizon (Heidegger, 1956: 364).

Since the soul is made divine by its created genesis, it is spiritually put under the volitional morality; hence, death becomes actionable only to project the interior world of *Shahada* into the horizon scene of the pure spiritual life neighboring God and his messengers. Still, following Heidegger's analysis, no assessment of value is possible without others; this ontological limitation is at work when it is turned to the way believers in the community contribute by their belonging to the process of value making. The metaphysics tied to the ideal *Ummah* could only be assessed if we take into account the continuous endeavour expressed by every believer to realize its

spiritual unity. Hence, the linkage is currently established under the glorification of the same value and the moral empowerment of God's unity through consolidating every believer's belonging to the same horizon of value. Contrasted to the modernized underpinnings of society, Islam's horizon of *Ummah* is deliberately integrated into the action field of morality in such a way that every spirited action done by Muslims contributes to the widening of the moral world recommended by *Allah* (Mc Lead, 2003: 84).

Death is a phenomenological signifying driver that ought to be added to the features of the horizon. Its realm is drawn in front of the Muslim's spirited action as a believer from the fact that his soul is put in the hands of God; it follows that acting as a spiritual agent in Islam glorifies the virtues of the global Spirit of *Ummah.* An adjacency between the moral world and the boundaries of Allah is central to the constitution of the religious community of believers in Islam; that is to say, the concrete existence of individuals is always spiritually projected into the ontology of the moral world. It is, therefore, agreed upon that living conformably to the moral ideals requires shared values among believers of the same community. This notion is heuristically understandable if we take it to be preliminary the notion that spiritualism constitutes and conditions the social collectiveness of believers in a prior way. The notion of *Ummah* is the spiritual stance upon which the believers come to inscribe their holy devolution to the sacred Oneness of Allah. In the former analysis of central status, formal *Shahada*, the nominal side of witnessing God's unity is shown as the same token whereby both the establishment of a spiritual community and the nominal belonging to it are concreted (Fruchon, 1994: 377).

The standpoint of the former analysis invests Heidegger's existential description of the individual's condition of being under the scope of death as a spiritual horizon. However, the phenomenological function attributed to death in Islam's system of values resets such analysis in front of a distinct value – situation. The believer is called from beginning to end to act upon his individual being as a part of the whole incarnated spirit of *Allah* into the *Ummah*; this phenomenological drive of meaning is far from being evidently understandable; it engages rather the practical side of putting one´s individual life under the radical interpretation of the absolute value. Thus, the existential scope of analysis ought to deal with the personalized life of individual rather as a disposition to access to the full realm of value. If *Jihad Anafss* (literally fighting by means of the soul) is duly situated within the scope of the highest spiritual morality, then this notion becomes possible only when the category of life is hermeneutically somehow interpreted (Dilthey, 1992: 110).

It is vital to provide the hermeneutic scheme behind the moralistic heroism of *Jihad*. The key point is to enlighten such a deliberative heading that purports the believer to act upon his/her existence as

a meaningful category of *life*. The lines of the agency are made problematic since death is taken to be actionable within the horizon of God´s appeal and the honour of one's unified community of believers. The radical effect of the absolute value is reflected through the way an individual splits his/her livable existence into two spheres: the divine soul and profane bodily stance. Following such a twofold framing of existence, a phenomenological grammar of acts comes to establish its proper sense. The bodily immersed life reflects the realm of desires as well as the mundane affairs of surviving; its acts are removed out of the scheme of values since living conformably to it refers merely to the cyclical scheme of survival; by contrast, the spiritual notion of the act is based rather on transcending bodily needs. For the Muslim morality, the believer never behaves like a bodying agent; s/he actualizes instead the very nature of the created soul. Hence, Islam's notion of *Takhalok* refers mainly to the Devine genesis of our soul (Taha, 200:85). The metaphysics of being a pure God's decree never leaves our soul while this latter tries to escape the worldly state of profane human affairs. Still, the process of attaining purified morality is undertaken among other neighboring believers; thus, if morality ought to be recognized, then it regularizes ethics amidst the same believers under the supreme Value of *Allah*. Nevertheless, acting under the ideal of *Jihad* projects the purified set of acts into the non-bodily order of valuation; the paradigmatic idea behind such moralization is that livable bodies are not coextensive to the ideal of purifying spiritual morality so far. The Muslim tends to conceive his/her connection with the realm of purified spirituality in terms of a radical agency upon his/her own embodied and personalized aspect of life.

What is described under the objective lenses to be an *Extreme* act in religious affairs is the spiritual agency upon one's life when the believer identifies his/her act rather with the very spiritual absolute ontology of value instead of putting them under the mundane current regulation of ethics. They are signs of loss, self-destroy, and auto-negation which accompany the first aspect taken as such they eclipsed the moral individual process of coming to death as a stage of depersonalization for the sake of the supreme value. There is a founded way in Islam to achieve the non-embodied performance of morality through reversing the meaning of life from the mundane existence of livable bodies to the depersonalized fusion into the Spirit of *Allah* and the unity of his *Ummah* (Ibn Taymya, n.d: 88).

The assumption behind the Appeal for *Jihad* is systematically understood if one grasps the central reversal discursively, which is made between what ought to be at the detriment of what it is. A community-based interpretation of the principle of morality claims to reorder lived reality conformably with the spiritual set of Islamic moral ontology. The practical scheme of behaving through the bodily acts upon the neighboring human and non-human surroundings is transcended. When it comes to acting upon our vivid bodies, our agency fulfills the ideal absolute value instead. Hence, the dead body together with the bloody scene of *Jihad* is the result left behind an embodiment of the supreme value right into the mortal seat of the believer's soul. This leads thereby to a highly ranged region of morality where acting is mainly conceived through the purified intention of the soul; body negation corresponds to the openly rejected moral reality for a worldly establishment of the spiritual value order. Everywhere in Islam's sphere of the sacrament, death is reset to indicate the reversal act which jeopardizes livable bodies to elevate the soul right into its divine genesis (Ibn Taymya, n.d: 98).

The spectacular act of *Tad'hiya* (sacrifice) embodies everywhere the phenomenological reversal between the livable and the divined valuation; it is meant to prioritize the latter rather than the former. The ceremonial religious events are commonly celebrated through the same moral postulation. Besides, valorizing God's unity and the *Ummah's* whole Spirit is always done through rituals meant to dedicate the soul to *Allah*, be it animal or transfigured human spirits; the pruned moral act concerns in each the identification of the human soul with the divine. However, the act is nonetheless funded by the other members' devotion to the same principle of absolutist value sign; in other words, the bloody effect of self-sacrifice re-signifies in return the purity of the whole religious community. There is a moral function attributed to the bloody act since its value is transfigured rather in convenience with the divine genesis of Spirit; this is meant to achieve the spiritual purgation hereby the same gesture of projecting the life of one's soul into the hereafter spiritual world. Thereby, this means that the radical value of faith becomes real only through the reversed order between the pure agent spirit and the negated bodily life. How does such a notion of projected spiritual ontology contribute to the establishment of an ethical and political framing of borders?

There should be an exchanged conditioning between the based spiritual agency and the notion of *Houdoud* (Borders) in Islam; the appeal for *Jihad* revolves around the assessment by every responsible believer of God's borders (*Houdoud Allah).* This notion is in line with the radical moral agency, to put it in ontological terms, wherever the extreme value appeal for the agency is responded, the realm of *Allah* comes true in the earth. Still, this paradigm is mediated by the holy text message. There is rather a hermeneutical stage through which God's borders come to be inscribed upon concrete and profane lives. The notion of God's limits is theologically problematic; its literal meaning contrasts with the supreme value postulated on him; as a subject matter of faith, no limited stance could be conceived to frame his idea. However, *the Qur´an* provides the evidenced moral interpretation behind the term; the coupled expression of Allah and

the limits projects the value of his recommendation right into the moral world of believers. Muslims are remembered all the while to consider God's borders, not in terms of theological representations but in terms of acts and real-world morality. If the notion of *Allah´s* borders is duly interpreted in terms of the limitation made by God to his believer's agency, then it draws the extension of his projected moral realm (Al Jabri, 221: 461). The *Jihadist* program of agency re-instantiates the reversed order of morality to politicize the spiritual moralistic ontology the moral is to achieve the equivalence between Allah's borders and the believers' mundane belonging to it; by so doing, they open new horizons for the active program of Islam's absolute moralization (Lahababi, 1967:108). The key emphasis of both the appeal and the learning is to replace the personalized consciousness of responsibility by the depersonalized divine limitation of individual's agency. The central divine limitation of morals in the *Jihadist* discourse eliminates the particular aspects of race, local determinations and even personal life qualifiers for the sake of the extreme devotion to the supreme value.

VI. Conclusion

The call made to render the believers soul to its creator in the name of *Allah* comprises a hermeneutic transcended moral limit of a common belonging to the same circumference of Spirit. One does not belong to the community of Islam in terms of their ethnic, race or language; that is to say, the only nominal performed act of witnessing *Allah's* unity prescribes to the Muslim the ontological world of morality within which every spirited act comes real. To grasp the mobile terms of radicalization in Islam, one have to understand that the individuals' religious life goes personalized from the first nominal act of *Tashahood (pronouncing the his/her first formal act of witnessing Allah oneness)* to the spirited extreme self-sacrifice and depersonalization by *Istishhad (the voluntary self-sacrifice for Allah's honor)*. Meanwhile, a Muslim's inner experience of meaning is logged within the same ontology of morals; its turning phenomenological point is founded on the projected radical act into the everlasting life of the purified soul.

Thus, from the phenomenological point of view, the extreme self–negation belongs to the personally lived absolute morality, the world of spiritually purified souls could only came true through the radical act of the alive bodies annulated, the self-destruction in no longer a significance that one has to justify herby, a radical act is not done by means of bodies, the intended act is transcended by the sense of its metaphysical intention, that's why the horrific scene of destroy is permanently transcended instead of being mourned; when the individual is significantly self-scarified through an act of absolute self-negation the unified and purified spirit of *Ummah* is still united and honourably alive.

An extreme religious experience in Islam contains a grammar of significance where the above mentioned absolute act of self-annulation could hardly been grasped as an experience of real world ontology; there is a heuristic challenge made flagrant when one is tempted by the development of due interaction between moral ontology and the spiritual lines of agency in Islam. Hence, categories of actions are not fully explained unless a hermeneutic justification of an absolute practice of spiritualism is set thereupon.

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